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ABSTRACT
This Article examines the type of evidence that can be used
to prove if an alleged infringer is liable for inducement of
infringement. Specifically, this article focuses on examining
whether an inference based on circumstantial evidence can
show whether the alleged infringer has the requisite state of
mind to induce infringement and compares inferences and
intent to induce infringement against intent in other areas of
patent law.
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INTRODUCTION
An individual or corporation may infringe a valid U.S.
Patent if the actions of the individual or corporation satisfy any
of the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 271.1 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)
provides that “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to
sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States
or imports into the United States any patented invention
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.” 2
Satisfying the requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) is known as
“direct infringement.”
In various instances, an individual or corporation does not
make, use, sell, or offer to sell the patented invention, but
rather encourages or induces others to make, use, sell, or offer
to sell the patented invention. In these instances, the
individual or corporation may still be liable for infringement
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), even though the individual or
corporation does not directly infringe the patented invention.3
35 U.S.C. § 271(b) provides that “[w]hoever actively induces
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”4
Inducement of infringement requires that there be a showing of
1.
2.
3.
4.

See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
Id.
See, e.g., id.
Id.
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an underlying act of direct infringement.5
In the context of patent litigation, recent Federal Circuit
and Supreme Court opinions have analyzed claims for
inducement of infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).6 These
opinions explain that an alleged infringer must have “specific
intent” to induce infringement in order to be liable as an
inducer. 7
“Specific intent” as articulated in DSU Medical Corp. v.
JMS Co., a 2006 en banc decision of the Federal Circuit Court
of Appeals, requires that in order to be liable as an inducer of
infringement, an alleged infringer must have “an affirmative
intent to cause direct infringement.”8 To meet this standard,
“evidence of culpable conduct, directed to encouraging another’s
infringement” must be proven.9
Evidence of culpable conduct may either be direct evidence
or indirect evidence.10 In instances where direct evidence of
culpable conduct is relied on to prove specific intent, it is
straightforward to conclude that an alleged infringer had the
requisite state of mind to induce infringement. In instances
when circumstantial evidence is used, it is difficult to prove
that an alleged inducer had the specific intent to cause direct

5. See, e.g., Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1341
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[A] finding of inducement requires a threshold finding of
direct infringement—either a finding of specific instances of direct
infringement or a finding that the accused products necessarily infringe.”); see
also Linear Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp., 379 F.3d 1311, 1326 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
6. See Akamai Techs. Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301,
1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Grp., Inc., 554
F.3d 1010, 1024–25 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc., 581
F.3d 1317, 1328–29 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Ricoh Co., 550 F.3d at 1342–43; DSU
Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304–06 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc).
7. See, e.g., DSU Med., 471 F.3d at 1306; see also Global-Tech Appliances
Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2062 (2011).
8. DSU Med., 471 F.3d at 1306 (“It must be established that the
defendant possessed specific intent to encourage another’s infringement and
not merely that the defendant had knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute
inducement.”).
9. Id. at 1306 (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, Ltd.,
545 U.S. 913, 936–37 (2005)); see also Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys.,
Inc. 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
10. See, e.g., DSU Med., 471 F.3d at 1306 (“While proof of intent is
necessary, direct evidence is not required; rather, circumstantial evidence may
suffice.” (quoting Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d. 660, 668 (Fed.
Cir. 1988))).
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infringement because the circumstantial evidence must be used
to draw an inference to the alleged inducer’s state of mind.11
This Article examines the intent doctrine for inducement of
infringement and the use of circumstantial evidence to prove
specific intent. Part I of this Article examines the current state
of the law of inducement of infringement in light of recent
Federal Circuit opinions. Part II provides a brief overview of
the history of the doctrine of specific intent to induce
infringement. Part III reviews intent in other patent law
doctrines. Part IV of this Article provides suggestions to modify
the current standard of specific intent to induce infringement,
so that it is harmonized with other areas of patent law. Part V
offers a brief conclusion.
I. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW OF INDUCEMENT
A. DSU MEDICAL CORP. V. JMS CO. (EN BANC DECISION)
In 2006, the Federal Circuit analyzed the doctrine of intent
to induce infringement in its en banc decision, DSU Medical
Corp. v. JMS Co.12 In this landmark decision, the Federal
Circuit determined that an alleged infringer, in the context of
induced infringement, must have “the required intent . . . to
induce the specific acts of [infringement] or additionally to
cause an infringement.”13 DSU resolved conflicting lines of
precedent regarding the intent requirement to show
inducement.14
In doing so, DSU clarified that intent in the context of
inducement of infringement requires that “the inducer must

11. See, e.g., id. at 1305–06 (“Grokster, thus, validates this court’s
articulation of the state of mind requirement for inducement.”); see also
Richard J. Stark & Andrei Harasymiak, Inducement of Patent Infringement:
The Intent Standard and Circumstantial Evidence of Intent, in INSIDE THE
MINDS: RECENT TRENDS IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT LAWSUITS 111, 137–40
(2011).
12. See, DSU Med., 471 F.3d at 1304–06.
13. Id. at 1304 (quoting MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi
Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1378 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
14. See MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp.,
420 F.3d 1369, 1378 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (discussing the lack of clarity in the
standard); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1363 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (discussing how actual intent is needed); Manville Sales Corp., 917
F.2d at 553 (stating that the plaintiff has to show “defendant possessed
specific intent to encourage another’s infringement”).
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have an affirmative intent to cause direct infringement . . . .”15
Proving affirmative intent involves establishing “evidence of
culpable conduct, directed to encouraging another’s
infringement, not merely that the inducer had knowledge of the
direct infringer’s activities.”16
While DSU clarified the standard for inducement of
infringement, post-DSU courts have struggled with analyzing
the type of evidence (direct or circumstantial) that can be relied
on to show intent through culpable conduct directed to
encouraging another’s infringement. This has resulted in
inconsistent outcomes for determining whether an alleged
inducer of infringement had the affirmative intent to encourage
another’s infringement. Recent cases finding no affirmative
intent to induce infringement are analyzed in Part I.B.1, while
cases finding affirmative intent to induce infringement are
analyzed in Part I.B.2.
B. POST-DSU CASES
1. Court Found No Affirmative Intent to Induce Infringement
In Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Medical Group, Inc.,
plaintiff Kinetic Concepts alleged that defendant Blue Sky
Medical Group induced direct infringement of a patent directed
to a method for treating a wound by applying suction.17 The
plaintiff argued that Blue Sky had the affirmative intent to
induce infringement of the patented method by selling kits
including a pump and product manuals containing instructions
to use the pump.18 The product manuals were argued to be
evidence of Blue Sky’s affirmative intent to induce
infringement.19
The Federal Circuit considered this evidence and
testimonial evidence from Blue Sky’s principals that Blue Sky
believed that its product performed a method in the public
domain and thus it did not have the intent to induce
infringement.20 The Federal Circuit relied on the testimonial
evidence and did not draw an inference that Blue Sky had the
15. DSU Med., 471 F.3d at 1306 (emphasis added).
16. Id.
17. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Medical Grp., Inc., 554 F.3d 1010
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
18. Id. at 1023.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1024–25.
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specific intent to induce infringement as the Federal Circuit
held that in this case “the intent required for induced
infringement was lacking.”21
In another Federal Circuit opinion, Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic
Holding, Inc., plaintiff Vita-Mix alleged that defendant Basic
Holding induced infringement of a patent directed to a method
for preventing the formation of an air pocket in a food
blender.22 Vita-Mix argued that because Basic Holding sold a
blender with a set of instructions that allegedly taught the
patented method, Basic Holding had the affirmative intent to
induce infringement.23
The Federal Circuit disagreed and held that the
instructions, and a second set of amended instructions,
provided no basis on which the plaintiff could rely to infer
specific intent to encourage infringement.24 In Vita-Mix, the
court found “the record is devoid of direct or circumstantial
evidence that [defendant] intends to encourage infringement by
its customers, and replete with evidence to the contrary” as the
instructions sold with the blender undisputedly taught noninfringing uses, evidencing intent to discourage infringement.25
The court, thus, did not rely on the evidence to infer specific
intent to encourage infringement.26
In Ecolab Inc. v. FMC Corp., the plaintiff FMC argued that
defendant Ecolab induced infringement of a patented invention
21. Id. at 1025 (“[T]he jury heard Blue Sky’s founders explain why they
did not believe they were infringing and had the opportunity to assess their
credibility. We find no basis to overturn the jury’s decision with respect to
inducement.”).
22. Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 1317, 1328–29 (Fed.
Cir. 2009).
23. Id. at 1328–29.
24. Id. (“[T]he record is devoid of actual evidence establishing specific
intent to encourage customers to infringe the ‘021 patent.”).
25. Id. at 1329 (“The original product instructions do not evidence a
specific intent to encourage infringement, since they teach a stirring action
which [defendant] could have reasonably believed was non-infringing. The
amended product instructions teach an undisputedly non-infringing use,
evidencing intent to discourage infringement. Thus, [defendant’s] product
instructions provide no basis on which Vita-Mix can rely to infer specific
intent to encourage infringement.”).
26. Id. at 1329 n.2 (“The question is not, however, whether a user
following the instructions may end up using the device in an infringing way.
Rather, it is whether [the defendant’s] instructions teach an infringing use of
the device such that we are willing to infer from those instructions an
affirmative intent to infringe the patent.”).
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directed to methods for applying a chemical alone or in
combination with other peracids directly to meat products to
reduce microbial populations on the meat surface.27
The Federal Circuit found that defendant Ecolab’s
personnel reasonably believed that the method claims did not
cover defendant’s product because the defendant’s product
contained the same combination of antimicrobial agents as
disclosed in the prior art.28 Thus, even though the product was
ultimately found to infringe the patent, the Federal Circuit
relied on evidence that the defendant’s product contained the
same combination of antimicrobial agents as disclosed in the
prior art as substantial evidence to conclude that the defendant
believed it was practicing the prior art and thus did not have
the intent to induce infringement.29
While the Federal Circuit applied DSU in the above cases
to find no intent to induce infringement, the Federal Circuit
reached the opposite result in the post-DSU cases found in Part
I.B.2.
2. Court Found Affirmative Intent to Induce Infringement
In AstraZeneca L.P. v. Apotex, Inc., the plaintiff
AstraZeneca alleged that the defendant Apotex had the
affirmative intent to induce infringement of a patent directed
to a method of administering a nebulized budesonide inhalation
suspension once a day.30 Prior to the lawsuit to receive FDA
approval, the defendant Apotex filed an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) for its nebulized budesonide inhalation
suspension product and carved out all references to
administration of once daily dosing from its package insert in
an effort to obtain FDA approval and avoid the patented
method.31
27. Ecolab Inc. v. FMC Corp., 569 F.3d 1335, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
28. Id. at 1351 (“[T]he jury could have reasonably concluded that
[defendant] lacked the intent required for induced infringement . . . because
Inspexx contains a synergistic combination of three antimicrobial agents, and
thus does not ‘consist essentially of’ [peroxyacetic acid] . . . [and] Ecolab
personnel reasonably believed that the ‘676 patent did not cover Inspexx
because Inspexx contains the same combination of antimicrobial agents
disclosed in the prior art Oakes patent.”).
29. Id. at 1351 ( “[T]he jury had substantial evidence from which it could
have reasonably concluded that Ecolab did not induce infringement because it
lacked the required intent.”).
30. AstraZeneca L.P. v. Apotex, Inc., 633 F.3d 1042, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
31. Id. at 1047.
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Despite Apotex’s efforts in its carve out, AstraZeneca
alleged that Apotex’s package insert included instructions
containing “titrate down” language, so that users of Apotex’s
product would understand to titrate down to a dosing regimen
of once a day, thus infringing the patented method.32
AstraZeneca argued that the “titrate down” language was
evidence that Apotex had the intent to induce infringement of
the patented method.33
In a preliminary injunction proceeding, the district court
found that Apotex had the affirmative intent to induce
infringement of the patented method by drawing an inference
based on Apotex’s intent in including this “titrate down”
language in the package insert.34 The district court found that
there was no evidence in the record that Apotex had attempted
to craft a non-infringing label and thus found that Apotex had
the specific intent to induce infringement.35
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding
that “despite being aware of the infringement problem
presented by the proposed label, Apotex nonetheless proceeded
with its plans to distribute the generic drug product.”36 The
Federal Circuit found that the “titrate down” language was
sufficient circumstantial evidence to infer Apotex’s intent to
induce infringement of the patented method.37
In Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., the claimed
invention was a method directed to a specific write strategy for
making legible marks on phase-change optical discs by using
optical drives.38 The defendant Quanta sold optical drives with
software that allegedly performed the claimed method.39 The

32. Id. at 1056–58.
33. Id. at 1057 (arguing that Apotex’s proposed label would induce
consumers to infringe the asserted method claims because the label implicitly
instructed users to administer the generic drug once daily).
34. Id. at 1047–49.
35. Id. at 1049.
36. Id. at 1060 (finding that the district court’s specific intent finding was
not based solely on the proposed label, but also on Apotex’s decision to proceed
with its plan to distribute the drug despite being aware that the label
presented infringement problems).
37. Id. at 1060 (citing Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco., Ltd., 850 F.2d 660,
668 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
38. Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1328 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
39. Id. at 1330.
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plaintiff Ricoh alleged that the only function of the software
sold by Quanta was to instruct the drives to perform the
patented methods and thus, Quanta induced infringement of
Ricoh’s patents, as it instructed infringers to perform acts of
direct infringement.40
The Federal Circuit held that it was a question of fact
whether the drives and software sold by Quanta had a purpose
other than the performance of infringing functions under
normal use conditions and remanded the inducement claim
back to the district court.41
Thus, as discussed supra, post-DSU cases have had
inconsistent results with determining intent to induce
infringement. This is because evidence relied upon to show
intent to induce infringement is typically circumstantial
evidence and courts have interpreted circumstantial evidence
to draw various inferences, sometimes inferring intent and
sometimes not. An analysis of the use of circumstantial
evidence to infer intent is analyzed infra.
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF THE
DOCTRINE OF SPECIFIC INTENT TO
INDUCE INFRINGEMENT
The doctrine that circumstantial evidence can be used to
prove intent was first established in a personal injury case,
Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc.42 Using circumstantial
evidence to prove specific intent to induce infringement in
patent law evolved from Michalic and through several
subsequent cases, which are analyzed below.
A. MICHALIC V. CLEVELAND TANKERS, INC.
Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc. was a personal injury
case where the plaintiff alleged that a 2.5 pound wrench
dropped on his toe during his use of the wrench while at
40. Id. at 1343.
41. Id. at 1342–44 (“[The District C]ourt erred in discounting evidence
that [Quanta] made a presentation to Dell, which touted the advantages of the
Quanta drives, on the grounds that the presentation disclosed an algorithm
rather than one of the claimed methods. The potential relevance of the
presentation is two-fold. First, the presentation is relevant to the extent it
indicates [Quanta] possessed the requisite intent that its drives be used to
perform the infringing methods. Second, the presentation is relevant to the
issue of whether it encouraged Dell to use the drives in an infringing
manner.”).
42. Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325 (1960).
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work.43 During trial, testimony was provided that the jaw of
the wrench repeatedly slipped from the nuts and had play in
it.44 Based on this testimony, the plaintiff alleged that the
wrench was defective, leading to the conclusion that the
defendant was negligent in having a defective wrench at the job
site.45
The Supreme Court used the circumstantial evidence
provided through witness testimony to infer that there was
play in the wrench and thus the defendant was negligent, even
though direct evidence of play in the wrench was not
established by the plaintiff.46 The Supreme Court held that
“[c]ircumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may also
be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct
evidence,” thus, establishing the use of circumstantial evidence
to prove culpability.47
B. MOLECULON RESEARCH CORP. V. CBS, INC.
Circumstantial evidence was incorporated into patent law
in 1986 in Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc.48 In
Moleculon, the patented invention was directed to method
claims for making a Rubik’s Cube.49 The alleged infringer sold
a Rubik’s Cube in pieces with an instruction sheet to put the
Rubik’s Cube together.50 The alleged infringer argued that
there was no evidence of direct infringement of the method
claims and thus no liability for the alleged infringer.51
The district court disagreed and held that the
circumstantial evidence of the Rubik’s Cube puzzle sales and
dissemination of an instruction sheet showed intent sufficient
to support a finding of inducement of infringement.52 This
43. Id. at 330–31.
44. Id. at 330.
45. Id. at 330–31.
46. Id. at 330 (holding that “there was no direct evidence of play in the
jaw of the wrench . . . [b]ut direct evidence of a fact is not required.”).
47. Id.
48. Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1272 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1263–64.
51. Id. at 1272.
52. Id. (relying on circumstantial evidence of extensive puzzle sales,
dissemination of an instruction sheet teaching the method of restoring the
preselected pattern with each puzzle, and the availability of a solution booklet
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finding was upheld by the Federal Circuit which stated that
evidence of the Rubik’s Cube puzzle sales and dissemination of
an instruction sheet provided the necessary circumstantial
evidence to prove that the alleged inducer had specific intent to
induce infringement.53
Thus, the court in Moleculon held that direct evidence of a
fact is not necessary and that circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to prove that an inducer has the intent to induce
infringement.54 Moleculon affirmed the holding in Michalic
that “circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may
also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct
evidence.”55
C. WATER TECHNOLOGIES CORP. V. CALCO, LTD.
Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd. upheld and further
developed the circumstantial evidence doctrine in patent law
established in Moleculon.56 In Water Technologies, an alleged
inducer gave infringing resins to a third party.57 The alleged
inducer argued that he had a subjective belief that he had
noninfringing resins, and thus, a finding of intent should be
negated by his subjective belief that there was no
infringement.58
The district court disagreed and found that there was
sufficient evidence to infer intent. The district court relied on
circumstantial evidence that the alleged inducer provided the
resin formulas to a direct infringer, helped the direct infringer
make the resins by controlling the direct infringer’s
manufacture of the resins. The alleged inducer also prepared
consumer use instructions.59 The district court used this
circumstantial evidence to infer that the alleged inducer had
the requisite intent to induce infringement.60
on how to solve the puzzle).
53. Id.
54. Id. It is significant to note that the inducer in Moleculon taught the
infringing use with instructions and the only way to form the product is in a
way that infringes the patent.
55. Id.
56. Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668–69 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
57. Id. at 668–69.
58. Id. at 668.
59. Id.
60. Id. The court specifically noted that controlling the direct infringer’s
manufacture of the resins is persuasive evidence that the defendant intended
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The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court and found
that “[t]he requisite intent to induce infringement may be
inferred from all of the circumstances.”61
D. METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER STUDIOS V. GROKSTER
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., a Supreme
Court decision, further analyzed the specific intent doctrine for
inducement, but in a copyright framework. In Grokster,
copyright holders sued distributors of peer-to-peer file sharing
computer networking software.62 The Court found that
evidence of active steps taken to encourage direct infringement,
such as advertising an infringing use or instructing how to
engage in an infringing use, showed an affirmative intent that
the product would be used to infringe.63
Furthermore, the Court found that when an article is good
for nothing else but infringement, there is no legitimate public
interest in its unlicensed availability, and there is no injustice
in presuming or imputing intent to infringe.64 Thus, Grokster
upheld Water Technologies by holding that circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to prove inducement of infringement.65
Thus, the Federal Circuit in Water Technologies and the
Supreme Court in Grokster have affirmed that circumstantial
evidence may be used to infer intent to induce infringement.
However, the intent required to prove inducement of
infringement is different from the intent required to prove
culpability in other areas of patent law, notably willful
infringement and inequitable conduct. The intent requirement
for willful infringement and inequitable conduct are discussed
infra in Part III.A–B.

to induce infringement. Id.
61. Id. at 669.
62. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919–
920 (2005).
63. Id. at 936.
64. Id. at 932.
65. Id. at 937 (“The inducement rule, instead, premises liability on
purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to
compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful
promise.”).
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III. INTENT IN OTHER AREAS OF PATENT LAW
A. WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT
Willful infringement is a patent law doctrine where an
alleged inducer willfully infringes a patent and is one of several
factors used to determine whether enhanced damages are
warranted under 35 U.S.C. § 284.66 Willful infringement has an
intent requirement, which is different than the intent
requirement for inducement.67
In In re Seagate Technology, L.L.C., the Federal Circuit
held that “to establish willful infringement, a patentee must
show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted
despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions
constituted infringement of a valid patent.”68 In re Seagate also
requires an intent prong directed to the state of mind of an
accused infringer as if the “threshold objective standard is
satisfied, the patentee must also demonstrate that this
objectively-defined risk (determined by the record developed in
the infringement proceeding) was either known or so obvious
that it should have been known to the accused infringer.”69
Thus, proving willful infringement requires considering
the alleged willful infringer’s subjective state of mind or intent.
Such subjective intent of the defendant was analyzed by the
Federal Circuit in Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc.
v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc.70
In Transocean, the patented invention involved an
improved apparatus for conducting offshore drilling.71 The
defendant, Maersk USA, made a modified rig that it believed
designed around the patented invention.72 The Federal Circuit
held that even though Maersk USA knew of the patents, it
66. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006); Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816,
826–28 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d
1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
67. WordTech Sys. v. Integrated Network Solutions, 609 F.3d 1308, 1316
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he legal standards for willfulness and inducement, such
as the requisite intent, are not identical.”).
68. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“It is
[a] high risk of harm, objectively assessed, that is the essence of recklessness
at common law.” (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 69 (2006))).
69. In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1371.
70. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors
USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1300–01 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1313.
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showed that it had the intent to avoid infringement by
designing around the rig, and thus, its actions were not
willful.73
B. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
The doctrine of inequitable conduct is a doctrine whereby
patentees are alleged to have deceived the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), thus leading to a holding
that a patent is unenforceable.74 To successfully prove
inequitable conduct, an accused infringer must provide
evidence that the patent applicant (1) made an affirmative
misrepresentation of material fact, failed to disclose material
information, or submitted false material information, and (2)
did so with the intent to deceive the PTO.75 Thus, inequitable
conduct has an intent requirement.76
To show deceptive intent, either direct or circumstantial
evidence may be used.77 However, “because direct evidence of
deceptive intent is rarely available, such intent can be inferred
from indirect and circumstantial evidence.”78 In this context,
the intent requirement for inequitable conduct is similar to the
intent requirement for inducement. However, intent in
inequitable conduct has an additional step; in order to draw an
inference of intent to deceive the PTO, “the inference must not
only be based on sufficient evidence and be reasonable in light
of that evidence, but it must also be the single most reasonable
inference able to be drawn from the evidence . . . .”79
Courts have debated whether various inferences are proper
to be drawn in the inequitable conduct framework. The court in

73. Id. at 1312–13.
74. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
75. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359,
1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2007)).
79. Id. at 1366–67 (emphasis added) (“Whenever evidence proffered to
show either materiality or intent is susceptible of multiple reasonable
inferences, a district court clearly errs in overlooking one inference in favor of
another equally reasonable inference.” (quoting Scanner Techs. Corp. v. ICOS
Vision Sys. Corp. N.V., 528 F.3d 1365, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008))).
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Cancer Research Technology Ltd. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.
held that
[a] court cannot simply infer that an applicant “should have known”
the materiality of withheld information and thus intended to deceive
the PTO because the applicant knew of the information and the
information is material. A district court must find some other
evidence that indicates that the applicant appreciated the
information’s materiality.80

Other courts have held that “when there are multiple
reasonable inferences that may be drawn, intent to deceive
cannot be found.” 81
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF SPECIFIC INTENT SHOULD
BE HARMONIZED WITH THE STANDARD FOUND
IN INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
As discussed in Part III.A–B, the requirement to show
intent in the inducement framework is different than the intent
requirement in willful infringement and inequitable conduct.
Richard Stark and Andrei Harasymiak, in their paper
Inducement of Patent Infringement: The Intent Standard and
Circumstantial Evidence of Intent, identify that the inducement
standard for intent is potentially subject to abuse as the
inducement statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), has no restriction on
the degree to which activities can facilitate inducement.82 Mr.
Stark recommends explicitly requiring objective consideration
of the strength of a defendant’s noninfringement and validity
defenses in determining the defendant’s intent, and he
suggests modifying the intent requirement for inducement to
parallel that of willful infringement.83
While Mr. Stark’s recommendation is one approach to
address the intent requirement for inducement, it is this
author’s opinion that the intent standard for inducement
should be equivalent to inequitable conduct, rather than willful
infringement. This suggestion would harmonize with existing
cases that use circumstantial evidence to infer specific intent. 84
80. Cancer Research Tech. Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 625 F.3d 724, 733–34
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).
81. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290–91
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
82. Stark & Harasymiak, supra note 11, at 112.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco., Ltd., 850 F.2d 660 (Fed. Cir.
1988); Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1272 (Fed. Cir.
1986); see also Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 550 F.3d 1325 (Fed.
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Moreover, in instances where circumstantial evidence is
relied upon by courts to draw an inference that an alleged
inducer has the specific intent to induce infringement, the
following three factors should be considered: (1) nexus; (2)
control; and (3) mitigating evidence of intent not to infringe.
These factors should be analyzed because they provide specific
insight into the state of mind of an alleged inducer.
A. NEXUS
Courts should consider the nexus between the
circumstantial evidence set forth to prove inducement and the
alleged state of mind of an inducer. In other words, the
circumstantial evidence provided by the patentee must show
that the alleged infringer had a direct connection to causing the
infringement.
For example, if the evidence includes instructions that
accompany a product and the instructions explicitly teach
performing the patented invention, a nexus may be established,
as a reasonable inference can be drawn that an alleged inducer
is encouraging a user of the product to perform the instructions
and, thus, to directly perform the act that infringes the patent.
However, the instructions must be explicit in order to establish
a nexus between the instructions and the alleged inducer’s
state of mind, as the only reasonable reading or interpretation
of the instructions must be to teach a user to infringe the
patent.
This is similar to the discussion in Grokster, in the context
of contributory infringement, “where an article is good for
nothing else but infringement, there is no legitimate public
interest in its unlicensed availability, and there is no injustice
in presuming or imputing an intent to infringe.”85 This is also
similar to the intent requirement in inequitable conduct, as an
inference of intent to induce infringement should only be drawn
by a Court if it is the single most reasonable inference that can
be drawn from the evidence.86 Otherwise, it is impossible to
Cir. 2008); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913
(2005).
85. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,
932 (2005) (citation omitted).
86. See Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357,
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359,
1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
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impute that an alleged infringer has the requisite state of mind
to induce direct infringement of a patent.
Thus, for inducement, if the only reasonable reading of the
instructions is to teach a user to infringe a patent, it is
straightforward to establish a nexus between the instructions
and intent to induce infringement. However, if a reasonable
reading or interpretation of the instructions is not to teach a
user to directly infringe the patent, then intent to induce
infringement should not be able to be inferred simply based
upon the instructions.
Courts have held that if the instructions teach
noninfringing uses of a product, it cannot be reasonably
inferred that the alleged inducer has the specific intent to
induce infringement.87 Furthermore, there are various
situations where it is improper to draw an inference of intent
simply based upon instructions. For example, when the
instructions are provided in order to meet certain industry
standards or industry requirements, then it cannot be
reasonably inferred that the alleged inducer had the specific
intent to induce infringement simply by providing the
instructions. Another situation involves having a third party
control the content of the allegedly infringing instructions. In
these instances, courts should consider two additional factors,
control and evidence of mitigating circumstantial evidence of
intent not to infringe, when making a determination whether
an alleged inducer has the requisite state of mind to induce
infringement.
B. CONTROL
To infer the specific intent of an alleged inducer, courts
should also consider whether the alleged inducer had control
over the instructions or actions of the direct infringer that
suggest that the alleged infringer’s state of mind was to
encourage another to infringe a patented invention.
87. “Specific intent to cause the acts which constitute infringement cannot
be inferred from actions that merely make possible both infringing and
noninfringing activities.” epicRealm, Licensing, L.L.C. v. Autoflex Leasing,
Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 608, 635 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (citing Warner-Lambert Co. v.
Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). “[I]ntent cannot exist
where the actions allegedly encouraging infringement could also encourage
alternative, noninfringing acts.” epicRealm, 492 F. Supp.2d at 635; see also
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
Moba v. Diamond Automation, 325 F.3d 1306, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2003); WarnerLambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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In Water Technologies, the fact that the alleged inducer
had control over the instructions was important in inferring
that the inclusion of those instructions with the product
evidenced a specific intent to induce infringement.88
Additionally, the fact that the alleged inducer helped the direct
infringer make the resins by exerting control over the direct
infringer’s manufacture of the resins was determined to be
critical in Water Technologies.
In contrast, when an alleged inducer does not exercise
control over the instructions or actions of the direct infringer,
one cannot simply infer intent based upon the circumstantial
evidence.89 In Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., the
patent was directed to a plotter system for forming images.90
Hewlett-Packard accused Bausch & Lomb (B & L) of inducing
infringement since B & L sold a division to a third party that
sold wheel plotters.91 The court found that after selling its
division to a third party, “B & L had no interest in nor control
over what [the third party] chose to do,” and “any of the
remaining details of the agreement between B & L and [the
third party were not] sufficiently probative of intent to induce
infringement.”92
Similarly, in L.A. Gear, Inc. v. E.S. Originals, Inc., the
patent involved lighted shoes having a circuit for causing
periodic flashing on and off of one or more lights.93 The alleged
inducer (Voit) entered into a contract with the shoe
manufacturer to distribute shoes with the VOIT trademark.
The court found that “nothing in the record indicates that Voit
exercised any ‘control’ over the accused shoes, other than
‘inspecting’ samples sent to it,” and thus found no
inducement.94

88. Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco., Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
89. Cf. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. JSP Footwear, Inc., 104 Fed. App’x.
721, 724 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[C]ontrol may indeed serve as a predicate for
induced infringement under appropriate circumstances.”); Sensonics, Inc. v.
Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
90. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1466–67
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
91. Id. at 1467.
92. Id. at 1470.
93. L.A. Gear, Inc. v. E.S. Originals, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 1294, 1296 (C.D.
Cal. 1994).
94. Id. at 1302.
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Thus, an inference of intent should only be able to be
drawn when the alleged inducer has control over the
instructions that are allegedly infringing. If the control
requirement is obviated, then the intent requirement is washed
away and inducement becomes a general tort (i.e., a strict
liability offense) just like direct infringement.95
For example, an alleged inducer might not have control of
the instructions as certain instructions might be required for
various reasons discussed above, such as being provided to
meet industry standards or to satisfy safety requirements.
Similarly, instructions might be controlled by a third party
agency, such as the FDA, which may require that instructions
and a certain wording of instructions that allegedly teach a
patent are provided with the product even though the alleged
inducer would not choose to include these instructions with the
product, and if possible, would remove the instructions.
For this reason, courts should consider and weigh whether
an alleged inducer had control over the instructions submitted
with a product or whether the alleged inducer had control over
the actions of the direct infringers as a second factor when
drawing an inference to determine affirmative intent to induce
infringement.
C. MITIGATING EVIDENCE NOT TO INFRINGE
Courts should also consider mitigating evidence of intent
not to infringe when determining whether an alleged infringer
has the specific intent to induce infringement. Evidence that
the alleged inducer took active steps to avoid infringement is
important, as this evidence shows that the alleged inducer did
not have the intent to encourage others to perform acts of direct
infringement.
Mitigating evidence of intent not to infringe may include
trying to remove the allegedly infringing language from the
instructions or taking various steps to ensure that
infringement does not occur. Other types of mitigating evidence
to avoid infringement may include promoting uses of the
product that do not infringe the patent or explicitly stating that

95. Direct patent infringement is a strict liability offense. See Blair v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 291 F. Supp. 664, 670 (D.D.C. 1968) (“[A]n
infringement may be entirely inadvertent and unintentional and without
knowledge of the patent.”); see also Mark A. Lemly, Inducing Patent
Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 225, 228–31 (2005).
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the alleged instructions should not be read to perform the acts
that directly infringe upon the patent.
Thus, in determining whether an alleged inducer has the
intent to induce infringement of a patent, courts also should
weigh evidence of mitigating circumstantial evidence of intent
not to infringe as a third factor in their analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, in instances where circumstantial evidence is
relied upon to infer that the alleged inducer has the requisite
state of mind to induce infringement, courts should weigh three
factors when drawing an inference of affirmative intent: (1)
nexus; (2) control; and (3) mitigating evidence of intent not to
infringe.
It is up to courts to weigh the circumstantial evidence in
light of these factors and to determine whether an alleged
inducer has the specific intent required to encourage others to
directly infringe upon another’s patent. These factors will guide
courts in making a proper determination of affirmative intent,
which does not result in inconsistent results.

